Abstract. Wireless roaming means that a mobile device is able to switch from one network cell to another while keeping the link to active services. Recent researches [13] showed that it increases the security to establish an authenticated and confidential tunnel directly to a home network which then acts as service provider respectively proxy server for further external services. In this paper we extend the trust assumptions and formal security goals for wireless roaming via tunnels (WRT) that were given by Manulis et al. [7] .
Introduction
Wireless LAN is a very popular communication medium today, since it allows its users to be mobile while having access to all services they usually use in a wired LAN. Recent technologies like IEEE 802.11a/g/n also allow a very high bandwidth, so that the advantages from the wired alternative become smaller and smaller.
To let wireless LAN become even more attractive, the coverage has to be improved further on, so that everyone has everywhere access to his preferred services. Of course, it is not possible to realize a single wireless LAN that covers a whole city region. That means, it is necessary to work with several smaller wireless networks that may be operated by foreign network providers. Therefore a cooperation with foreign network providers is required.
There are three problems to solve:
1. When connecting to foreign wireless LAN providers, it is important to preserve the own security. 2. While switching between two wireless LAN cells, current running services like VoIP, video or audio streaming should not be affected.
Our Roaming and Accounting Solution
Before we can go over to present our new protocols EAWRT (Efficient Authenticated Wireless Roaming via Tunnels) and WRA (Wireless Roaming Accounting), we have to define the environment for both protocols formally. That is defining the protocol participants and the used key material (section 2.1), the identifiers for instances and protocol sessions in section 2.2, our trust assumptions (i.e. who trusts who) in section 2.3, the adversary abilities (section 2.4) and last but not least the building blocks (cryptographic primitives and abbreviations) of our protocols in section 2.5.
After that we present our roaming protocol (EAWRT) in section 3 and the accounting protocol (WRA) in section 4, giving proof sketches for the correctness as well as the security of the protocols.
Protocol Participants and Key Material
The protocol participants are namely the mobile device M, a foreign network F and a home network H. The user of the mobile device M has got a service contract with a home network H, which gives him access to several provided services by H, wherever an appropriate network infrastructure is given. An appropriate network infrastructure is realized through the nodes of the foreign network F , that provide on the one side wireless access for all M and on the other side a fast link to the home network H. We assume, M and H are in possession of a common longterm key k MH that is chosen with respect to the security parameter l.
For relaying data between M and H, the foreign network wants to get paid. Therefore there is another contract between each foreign network F and home network H. Because there may be a lot of different home networks and even more foreign networks, it is not efficient to provide a symmetric key between each foreign network and each home network.
For that reason, each foreign network F and home network H own a DiffieHellman public key pair {SK, P K} which is chosen with regard to the security parameter l.
Instances and Protocol Sessions
The number of the mobile devices M, foreign networks F and also home networks H may be very big, so it is likely that the same F or H (or even M) are participants in several parallel protocol sessions. We want to extend this by saying that it is possible that there are different protocol sessions with the same M, F and H. The number of parallel protocol sessions is denoted as q (later used in the security analysis).
We claim that there is an unlimited number of instances of M, F and H, whereby denoting an instance as X s with X ∈ {M, F , H} and s ∈ N N . Three instances M, F and H are called partnered when they have the same session id An instance of H, M, F in a protocol session calls ACCEPT or ABORT upon the decision if the protocol execution was successful in respect to the protocol aims.
Trust Assumptions
Before protocol execution, the mobile device M and the home network H share some credentials that allow them to do a mutual authentication, which is necessary for establishing a trusted communication tunnel. Since H provides a service for M, both parties must have a contract with each other, including on the one hand credentials and on the other hand rules for accounting and usage.
The foreign network F is responsible for the relay of the tunnel data between the mobile device M and the home network H. Mutual authentication between F and H is required, because the foreign network F clearly wants to get paid for the forwarding service it provides and must therefore be aware of H's identity. Additionally the home network H wants to be sure about F 's identity to realize a fair payment. Furthermore sharing credentials between F and H to support the accounting process may be necessary.
The mobile device M will be implicitly authenticated against the foreign network F due to the fact that H accepts in the protocol. The same applies for the foreign network F against M, because the mobile device M is assured that H would not have been accepted when the authentication between F and H had failed.
Adversarial Model
The adversary A is modelled as a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) machine and has full control over the communication and protocol invocations. A is allowed to do the following queries: 
Building Blocks
Now, we itemize the cryptographic primitives that are used by the proposed protocols EAWRT ( Fig. 1 ) and WRA ( Fig. 2 ).
-A cryptographic hash function that provides preimage, second preimage and collision resistance [11] . Hash: {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l . By Succ preimage Hash (l) we denote the success probability for a PPT adversary to find a preimage for a given output ∈ {0, 1} l of the hash function. Succ
2nd-preimage Hash
(l) denotes the success probability for a PPT adversary to find a second preimage ∈ {0, 1} * for a given preimage-hash pair ∈ {0, 1} * , {0, 1} l . -A message authentication code (MAC) that suffices the weak unforgeability against chosen message attacks (WUF-CMA) [4] . Succ wuf-cma MAC (l) denotes the success probability over all PPT adversaries to find a MAC forgery under access to the MAC oracle. A MAC is verified with ver key (value).
-A pseudo random function PRF: {0, 1}
l × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * for key derivation. We denote the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries (running within time l) in distinguishing the outputs of PRF from the outputs of a random oracle better than Pr= -A symmetric encryption scheme with integrity protection that suffices the indistinguishability property under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [2] . We denote the advantage that an adversary is able to decrypt (dec) at least one bit without knowing the used key as Adv ind-cca2 DEC (l). Furthermore, the symmetric encryption scheme satisfies weak unforgeability against chosen message attacks. The adversary's success probability to encrypt (enc) without the right key and gaining a valid ciphertext is Succ value is within a logical range. The range may be of length one (an expected value). verify is used, when the expected value must be cryptographically computed, e.g. when the expected value must be hashed.
Roaming Protocol (EAWRT)
In the following, we propose a new protocol for the wireless roaming via tunnels scenario. We introduce a more efficient protocol than Manulis et al. by abandoning on digital signatures and asymmetric encryption. Due to this, we have smaller messages and we need less computation time. Additionally we support anonymity of the mobile device. The EAWRT protocol is shown in Figure 1 . M, F , H are the identities of the participants and AID M is the anonymous identity of M.
i mod p are the private respectively public diffie-hellman parameter for i ∈ {F, H}. In detail (but not shown in the figure), there is also a big prime p that conforms to the security level l and a base g that generates Z Z * p .
Fig. 1. Efficient Authenticated Wireless Roaming via Tunnels (EAWRT)

Correctness of EAWRT
The authentication and key establishment protocol Π (Figure 1) is correct, when definition 1 holds. , then k F H is identical on both sides. The combination of both statements gives an idea for the correctness proof of EAWRT.
Definition 1 (Correctness EAWRT
Security Definitions for EAWRT
Now we state the security goals that have to be achieved between the mobile device M, the foreign network F and the home network H. Between M and H mutual authentication, integrity and confidentiality is required. These goals can be obtained by using symmetric cryptographic methods based on key material which is agreed on both sides. Non-repudiation is not explicitly required, which leads to the fact that no asymmetric cryptography is necessary.
Definition 2 (Mutual Authentication between M and H). A wins if one of the following arises during the protocol run:
1 
After further interaction, A terminates and outputs a bit b
A wins Game 
Definition 4 (Mutual Authentication between F and H). A wins if one of the following arises during the protocol run:
After further interaction, A terminates and outputs a bit b
A wins Game ake−F −H Π (A, l) if b = b. The maximum probability of the adversarial advantage over the random guess of b, over all adversaries (running in time
l) is Adv ake−F −H Π (A, l) = max A |2Pr[Game ake−F −H Π (A, l) = b] − 1|.
Definition 6 (Anonymity of M). This goal protects the anonymity of M by hiding the real identity of M towards F and all protocol outsiders. A PPT adversary A wins if one of the following occurs, after M and H have accepted: 1. A knows the real identity of M 2. A knows if an instance of M has participated in a previous accepted session 3. A recognizes an instance of M when it participates in a next session
Proof Sketches for the Security of EAWRT
Having all definitions and assumptions in place, we proceed proving the security of the EAWRT protocol. To give a full security proof, we need to show that the protocol accomplishes the security goals from definition 2 to 6. Due to lack of space we only give short proof sketches and refer to [10] for the full security analysis of EAWRT.
Theorem 1 (Mutual authentication between M and H). With a WUF-CMA secure MAC, the protocol Π of EAWRT provides mutual authentication in the sense of definition 2 and
wuf-cma MAC (l).
Proof (sketch).
The advantage of the adversary can be reduced to the collision of the three nonces r M , r F , r H (within q sessions) and the adversary's probability successfully forging MAC-1 or MAC-2.
Theorem 2 (Authenticated Key Exchange between M and H). With a pseudo random function and a WUF-CMA secure MAC, the protocol Π of EAWRT provides authenticated key exchange in the sense of definition 3 and
Proof (sketch). The advantage of the adversary can be reduced to the collision of the three nonces r M , r F , r H , the adversary's probability successfully forging MAC-1 or MAC-2 and the success probability of distinguishing k MH from a random value in all q sessions.
Theorem 3 (Mutual Authentication between F and H). With a WUF-CMA secure MAC, the protocol Π of EAWRT provides mutual authentication in the sense of definition 4 and
Succ MA−F −H EAWRT (l) ≤ 3q 2 2 l + Succ wuf-cma ENC (l) + qAdv ind-cca2 DEC (l).
Proof (sketch).
The advantage of the adversary can be reduced to the collision of the three nonces r M , r F , r H and the adversary's probability successfully forging an encryption E F . Additionally, if the adversary is able to extract one bit of information out of E F , it is possible to create a distinguisher that breaks the IND-CCA2 security. The advantage of breaking the IND-CCA2 security (q parallel sessions) is added to the success probability of the adversary.
Theorem 4 (Authenticated Key Exchange between F and H). With a static Diffie-Hellman and a IND-CCA2 secure symmetric encryption, the protocol Π of EAWRT provides authenticated key exchange in the sense of definition 5 and
Proof (sketch). The advantage of the adversary can be reduced to the collision of the three nonces r M , r F , r H , the secrecy of tk F H breaking the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, the security of E F by beeing able to extract one bit of information about k F H (IND-CCA2) and at last the pseudo randomness of k F H due to beeing able to predict a random value for the used pseudo random function (PRF).
Theorem 5 (Anonymity of M). With a pseudo random function PRF, the protocol Π of EAWRT provides anonymity of M in the sense of definition 6 and
Proof (sketch). he advantage of the adversary can be reduced to the collision of the three nonces r M , r F , r H and the pseudo randomness of AID M .
Combining the previous five theorems, we state security of EAWRT according to the defined security goals.
Accounting Protocol (WRA)
We extended the model of Manulis et al. by the need for a fair accounting. To realize that, we propose the WRA protocol, which is an extension to the normal tunnel communication between the mobile device M and the home network H. Additionally to the tunnel data, which is represented by MSG and MSG2, we have added some cryptographic measures to ensure that the foreign network F is able to proof, how many data was relayed. As consequence, the foreign network F is able to bring this size of transmitted data to account, whereby neither H nor F is able to cheat. The home network H acknowledges the size of the transmitted data to F via two mechanisms. Firstly as an absolute value of the transmitted bytes in a
MSG2, COINS, MAC [, SIG]
B := # transmitted bytes
Coin digital signature. Secondly as an element of a hash chain, representing a value relative to the last digitally signed value. Figure 2 shows the WRA protocol. The size of the used hash chain is denoted by n. B is the number of transmitted bytes, whereby Base is the last digitally signed value of B.
Correctness of WRA
The accounting protocol is correct when definition 7 holds. The correctness of WRA can be proven with these considerations.
Definition 7 (Correctness WRA
Security Definitions for WRA
Between F and H mutual authentication is required for accounting. Both sides have to be sure about the identity of the other party, so that one side can account its provided service and the other side will accept the issued bill. Integrity protection and maybe confidentiality are necessary to protect the accounting data communicated between F and H. 
Definition 8 (Fair Accountability
)
Proof (sketch).
Given the appearance probability of SIG as Pr[SIG occurs] := 1 m with 1 < m ≤ n and n the length of the used hash chains. The adversary's advantage can be reduced to forging (EUF-CMA) a signature SIG, appearing with the probability 1 m , the forgery of COINS to a higher value by finding any valid preimage (maximum n) for a given value and the success probability of forging the value MAC (WUF-CMA).
Efficiency of EAWRT and WRA
In comparison with the WRT protocol from Manulis et al. [7] , the EAWRT protocol has some obvious advantages in respect to performance, since we abandon digital signatures and asymmetric encryption. Due to this, we have notably smaller sized messages and less computation time needed. Particulary for mobile devices this approach fits good, because their computation power respectively battery power is limited.
Moreover, we are able to improve the performance from EAWRT even more by applying some precomputations. The computation of tk F H , the static diffiehellman key, is computational expensive but has to be done only one time for all protocol instances with the same F and H. So, this key can be computed at the first contact between F and H and then stored for later use.
After the last message of the EAWRT protocol, H verifies MAC-2 by comparison with a self-computed MAC-2. This computation can be done earlier to save time. The verification MAC-2 can be computed by H right after sending out his message r H , E F , while waiting for the last message of the protocol.
Our accounting protocol (WRA) works like an addon to the normal communication (MSG, MSG2). To each message, only one hash value (COINS) and one MAC value is added (in total 256-512 bits). Additionally, everytime our hash chain runs out of preimages, a digital signature setting a new root for the hash chain is appended.
Since digital signatures need a big amount of space (usually 1024-4096 bits without canonicalization) and computation time, it is desirable to abandon them as long as possible. Therefore the length of the hash chain n should be chosen in respect to efficiency.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced two new properties for the wireless roaming via tunnels scenario. At first, the anonymity property, which allows the user of the mobile device to stay anonymous for outsiders (including the foreign network) while roaming. This includes the unlinkability of two different sessions.
The second property is named fair accounting, which has a special meaning for this scenario. It is necessary for the foreign network, which forwards the tunnel data between the mobile device and the home network, that the home network approves the size of the transmitted data. Since the foreign network wants to get paid for relaying, the home network's confirmation of the size of the transmitted data must be non-repudiative, in other words: signed. In dispute, the foreign network can present the signatures and demand the payment.
We have presented an optimized AWRT protocol (named EAWRT), that fulfills the requirements proposed by Manulis et al. [7] . Additionally, our protocol has the anonymity property and is designed to be more efficient. Notably the efficiency of our protocol is important, since we want to allow near realtime services like VoIP or video chats even in roaming cases.
Moreover we showed up a solution for the accounting problem by introducing another protocol named WRA. This protocol attaches some cryptographic values to the normal communication flow and can thereby enforce fair accounting without too much overhead.
For both introduced protocols there is a full security analysis in [10] .
